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M. N. Pearson 
Within the broad category of radical history, which seems to be the 
same as political economy, there is no question that the dominant 
paradigm has been laid out by Immanuel Wallerstein in his world-system 
model. Since the first volume appeared in 1974 his work has set the 
agenda, leaving orthodox Marxists, let alone modernisation theorists, 
liberal market analysts and empiricists floundering in his wake. It even 
seems that post-modernists, after their brief florescence, have returned 
to the obscurity they deserve. Wallerstein's work produced a host of 
rebuttals, modifications, and elaborations. Yet from the beginning even 
the most trenchant critics have never questioned the value of his 
enterprise; rather they have been concerned to improve it, to a greater 
or lesser extent modify it, but they still recognise its seminal importance. 
I propose in this short tribute to Soumyen Mukherjee, himself well 
known for his promotion of 'radical' history, to sketch some recent trends 
in world-system research, and then to present a very sketchy analysis 
to show how these recent works may have some utility for looking at 
the history of East Africa and India in the early modern period. 
This is not the place to provide a detailed overview of Wallerstein's 
model of the modem world-system. 1 Very briefly, Wallerstein believes 
that from about 1500 there evolved in western Europe a modern world-
system, which is to be seen as a new sort of world-economy because it 
was capitalist. For this reason it has lasted much longer than previous 
examples of world-economies, and since the late nineteenth century has 
incorporated the whole globe. This then is a dynamic system in which 
change occurs, unlike A. G. Frank's rather static dependency theories 
of nearly three decades ago. Indeed, the model may even be predictive, 
for Wallerstein believes and hopes that this capitalist system will collapse 
within the next century or so, leading to a socialist world government. 
Within the modern world-system Wallerstein delineates three 
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zones, linked by unequal exchange designed to extract a surplus and 
convey it to the dominant areas. These three zones, which are primarily 
differentiated by different labour systems, are the dominant cores 
to which the surplus flows, the peripheries from which it is extracted, 
and the semi-peripheries which act as a cushioning or mediating zone 
between the two extremes of core and periphery. Here is another element 
of dynamism, for areas can rise and fall, enter and then leave the core, 
move from semi-peripheral to core, or to peripheral, status. The three 
types of zones are not necessarily conterminous with particular states, 
though from time to time there have been hegemonic states within the 
cores. 
Outside this modem world-system there were, until it incorporated 
the whole world in the late nineteenth century, areas which were deemed 
to be external. Trade between external and modern world-system areas 
was in luxuries, and unlike necessities these cannot create systemic 
relations. This distinction has been one of the most criticised of all 
aspects of Wallerstein's work, yet while he has shown openness and 
flexibility in some other areas, here he stands firm. In a recent essay he 
retains the distinction, and stresses that it is a key one analytically. 
Wallerstein's grand design is not yet completed, for the fourth volume 
has yet to appear. Nevertheless, he has been active in responding to 
criticisms, and producing elaborations of this schema. 2 There are several 
overviews of early critiques of his work. 3 I intend now to look at some 
of the more important modifications and critiques which have appeared 
in the 1990s. But this is a fertile field indeed; space and my own no 
doubt only partial reading mean I can only sketch a few recent pieces 
which have struck me as interesting, or indeed merely have come to 
my attention. Just as the sketch above of the fundamentals of 
Wallerstein's work is far too brief and does little justice to the complexity 
of his model, so also my survey of the recent literature will reveal huge 
gaps and ignore many other no doubt seminal contributions. 
Right from the start some critics have claimed that the modern world-
system is too 'economist', for it ignores other ways in which people 
and societies have been linked. Chase-Dunn and Hall, whose work we 
will return to later, note that there are all sorts of exchanges-in trade, 
information, military exchanges for example. Even if one only looks at 
material exchanges, these can be gifts, tribute, commodity trade, etc. 
A more sustained attempt to look at non-material ties has been put 
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forward by Vall. He starts, as is usual, by noting 'the luxuriant 
productivity of this [world-system] perspective'.4 He wants to describe 
non-material elements that tie places together; his example is the Muslim 
world c. 1~1800. He finds that Dar al-Islam is 'a special example 
of a large-scale human group' and quotes McNeill on this: 'What is 
common to all groups, surely, is a pattern of communication among 
members, sufficiently frequent and sufficiently standardised as to 
minimise surprises and maximise congruence between expectation and 
experience so far as encounters within the group are concerned.' Voll 
says: 'This pattern of communication in the Islamic world is not 
primarily based upon exchange of goods, coordination of means of 
production, or a large network of economic activities. Instead, it is built 
on the shared sources of the Islamic experience, which provide the basis 
for mutually intelligible discourse among all who identify themselves 
as Muslims within the Dar al-Islam. '5 'The Muslims might be s~d to 
have created the "Islamic world-system", identified by a distinctive set 
of sociomoral symbols for the definition of proper human 
relationships .... I am suggesting that both [the modern world-system 
and the Islamic world-system] are relatively comprehensive social 
systems that can qualify as world-systems, even though the primary 
identifying characteristics are drawn from different dimensions of 
the social system as a whole. ' 6 Thus the modern world-system is not 
the first long-lasting world-system without a world-empire, and yet the 
Islamic world-system was not a world-economy. 
On the one hand, in the light of my recent work on the integrating 
function of the hajj in the early modern period,7 this is a perspective 
with which I am very sympathetic. Nevertheless, a rigorous political 
economist, and I think we could include Wallerstein here, would 
merely say that these links, while they exist no doubt, have no important 
consequences. Or, to put it another way, any Marxist or neo-Marxist 
would still insist that we are talking here about superstructure, not base. 
Were we to look at the material base we would find a v~ry different 
sort of world-system, more likely systems, in the very area Voll is 
describing, and of course this base, or these bases, determine the 
superstructure. 
Wallerstein saw the creation of capitalism in western Europe from 
the sixteenth century as the decisive event in recent world history. The 
problem is that, like it or not, capitalism did develop first in this area, 
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not somewhere else, and this process did expand to affect the whole 
world and leave the rest of the world in a subordinate material position 
vis-a-vis Europe. Yet this sometimes leads to charges that he is 
'Eurocentric'. Attempts to rectify this, notably by Abu-Lughod and 
Frank and Gills, are implicitly, sometimes explicitly, aimed to avoid 
this perceived bias, for they aim to identify world-systems before 
(European) capitalism.8 This seems to be an ill-conceived complaint. 
Wallerstein and his followers stress Europe not for racist reasons but 
because objectively this is where the portentous development of 
capitalism did occur, and for the last 500 years this has been the one 
seminal fact in world history. There is however a related matter, which 
is that Wallerstein has sometimes, and with some justice, been criticised 
for knowing more about Europe than about the areas which Europe 
peripheralised. This however, it seems to me, can easily be rectified by 
accumulating more empirical data. It is hardly a central flaw of 
perspective. 
The main thrust of recent world-system work (or maybe this 
statement merely reflects my own pre-modern research interests) is 
devoted to investigating the nature of world-systems before capitalism, 
that is before say 1500. However, it is of course possible to have 
world-systems existing after this in areas not yet incorporated, for 
example East Asia before the nineteenth century. The idea is to look 
at connections within and between societies, to challenge any idea of 
discrete states making their own history unaffected by other areas. All 
thj s is of course a direct contradiction of older modernisation 'theories'. 
A very successful early attempt to do this was Eric Wolf's well known 
text, which stressed connections in the world at 1400.9 
Wallerstein's contributions here are at best sketchy, for they play 
little role in his main concern, which is with the nature of the modern 
world-system. He found two sorts of earlier world-systems, namely 
world-e1ppires and world-economies, the latter of course being non- or 
pre-capitalist. Both were inherently unstable. World-empires sooner or 
later collapsed, as their rulers lacked the capacity to enforce their will 
over their vast territories and also because as rulers they had to defend 
their whole domain. World-economies were destined to be taken over 
by world-empires. World-economies are more or less a residual category; 
he noted early on that there are world-empires, and then for 'convenience 
and want of a better term', there are world-economies. 'Prior to the 
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modem era [and the modem world-system], world-economies tended 
either to be converted into empires or to disintegrate.' However, we 
must give him credit for being aware that this is unsatisfactory. He 
noted in 1990 that the new challenge for world-system theorists is 
the 'elaboration of world-systems other than that of the capitalist world-
economy.' 10 Earlier he said that we 'shall have to rework our knowledge 
of world historical data (as well as expand it) in order to analyse 
coherently how pre-capitalist economies functioned, which will-I 
believe--open many doors for us' .11 
The master then is sympathetic, and indeed he himself, sometimes 
in collaboration with others, has contributed here. As one example, of 
relevance to my own empirical concerns, with Ravi Palat he wrote on 
India as a pre-capitalist core. They sketch the growth of trade, and the 
subsequent accumulation of riches in the two most commercialised 
areas, Coromandel and Gujarat, and in an innovative way tie this in to 
wet-rice cultivation. But this of itself does not have to mean there was 
'an increasingly singular divisioning of labour to which we refer when 
we use the concept of a world-economy'. It couldjust show an exchange 
of preciosities between two autonomous systems, such as between India 
and Europe in 1500-1750. However, in fact this trade 'represented a 
transfer of the products of lowly-remunerated labourers located 
elsewhere along the Indian Ocean littoral to South Asia'. This was 
especially to be seen in the huge rise of coarse cotton cloth production 
in Gujarat and Coromandel, and the consequent 'deindustrialisation' 
of other regions in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. Indeed, in this 
pre-capitalist world-economy there are semi-peripheries too. Bengal 
exported rice to Coromandel and raw silk to Gujarat, but at the same 
time it sent cloths to Indonesia, and has the janus-faced character of 
a semi-periphery. The emerging core zones of Gujarat and Coromandel 
'progressively drew upon sources of subsistence and raw materials 
for artisanal manufacture from increasingly distant regions-leading 
to the incorporation and subsequent peripheralisation of the latter zones 
within an emerging world-economy centred around, and integrated 
by, transport across the Indian Ocean'. 
Thus there was 'from the eastern coasts of Africa through the Arabian: 
peninsula and the Indian subcontinent to the Malay archipelago ... an 
evolving world-economy ... .' Yet this was not the same as a capitalist 
world-economy, in other words a modem world-system, partly because 
167 
M. N. Pearson 
there was no ruthless drive to accumulate, but also because the basis 
lay in the nature of wet-rice cultivation. Various things flowed from 
this, including different political structures. Thus what happened after 
1400 in the Indian Ocean area was different from Europe, and the 
result was that in Europe a capitalist world-economy emerged, while 
in the Indian Ocean area it did not, especially as there was no real 
subsumption of labour to capital, which is a crucial part of the 
development of capitalism. 12 This is to be seen as an important step 
forward by Wallerstein himself as we try to specify more clearly the 
nature of world-economies before capitalism. Before 1500, their chosen 
terminal date, there is no modern world-system but there is a world-
economy based on India, and no doubt others elsewhere. The question 
then becomes what is the situation once tl}e modern world-system 
emerges after 1500. India, we are told, remains external to this until 
the late eighteenth century, and so presumably the world-economy 
centred on India continued, until bits were chipped away from it and 
incorporated in the expanding modern world-system. When the core, 
India, was peripheralised this world-economy obviously was ended. 
Yet at another level this is a familiar story, especially in their view 
of how capitalism is to be differentiated from capital. Here and elsewhere 
he stresses the absolute centrality of the 'ceaseless accumulation of 
capital',l3 though a more orthodox Marxist, such as Eric Wolf at least 
on this point, would make more of the dramatic difference between 
capital as money, and capitalism, and would note the key fact that capital 
must penetrate and control production in order for there to be capitalism. 
Several other scholars have produced larger works devoted to 
describing early world-economies. The results have been mixed. Janet 
Abu-Lughod's book14 was sympathetically reviewed by Wallerstein. 15 
Abu-Lughod finds a world-system in the century 1250-1350 whose 
heartland was the Middle East, but which included Europe, China 
and the Indian Ocean. The linkage at this time of these areas, based on 
long distance trade, resulted in an economic upturn in them all. This 
is a world-system which linked a number of world-systems, each of 
which had cores, semiperipheries and peripheries making up an 
integrated production system. None of these world-systems was 
dominant; rather there was co-existence and mutual tolerance and profit 
within the larger world-system. In short, she finds a benign interacting 
group of world-systems, or world-economies. There was no single 
168 
World-Systems Before Capitalism 
hegemonic power, and this is a contrast with what grew out of it, 
the capitalist world-system dominated by Europe. One core was the 
'Arabo-Persian imperial centres' another 'the towns of developing 
western Europe'. Thus we can see that world-systems are not all the 
same, and also that they can change. 
All this is well taken, yet she seems to be comparing two different 
things. She claims that there are different sorts of world-systems, some 
like Wallerstein's with cores which are dominant, others like hers where 
there are cores but no hegemony. This may be true, but she neglects to 
note that Wallerstein's world-system is capitalist, and surely this makes 
all the·difference, for this requires cores to be dominant. Nor indeed 
does a pre-capitalist world-system necessarily have cores which are not 
dominant, as we have just noted Palat and Wallerstein pointing out. 
Indeed, I am uneasy about her whole notion of a core which is not 
dominant, and what follows from this, the notion that this was a benign, 
non-extractive, world-system: it seems to me that core and dominance 
are inextricably linked, indeed one implies the other either in a capitalist 
system or any other. If areas are linked in a hierarchical world-economy 
there must be some unequal exchange. Only if there is no hierarchy 
within the system (and in this case is it a system at all?), or if one looks 
at relations with areas external to the system, will there be a benign and 
non-exploitative relationship. Later we will note Chase-Dunn and Hall 
claiming that there is something which they call core/periphery 
differentiation, and they seem to imply that this also does not involve 
inequality. This is one among many areas where more research and 
reflection is needed. 
Returning to Abu-Lughod, one could also point to a less than rigorous 
use of terminology, yet this is important in this sort of work. She uses 
'world economy' and 'international trade economy' interchangeably, 
and sometimes refers to Wallerstein's 'modem world system' whereas 
in fact he always has 'modern world-system'. The hyphen is crucial, 
for it assumes integration and cohesion. 
In all this, Abu-Lughod is not denying that something changed in 
the sixteenth century when capitalism appeared, even if she fails to go 
into this very much. Her work is important and useful. A. G. Frank's 
recent work, sometimes in collaboration, is much more dubious. First 
in an article, very tolerantly published by Wallerstein in his journal 
Review in 1990, and subsequently in a co-edited book, he has put 
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forward the extraordinary notion that the present world-system (not 
world-system) goes back to at least 2500 BC. There has been only 
one world-system in all of history. Late in its career this world-system 
was first joined and then dominated by Europe. However, Frank refuses 
to see this as marking a major break: 'I will also question the supposed 
historical uniqueness and perhaps the social-theoretical relevance of 
the modem capitalist mode of production.' Networks and world-systems 
have existed long before capitalism, and he quotes Chase-Dunn that 
'any regularised and repetitive exchange of material goods which 
substantially affects the welfare of a population or the maintenance of 
a power structure constitutes part of a single world-system network' .16 
Soon afterwards Frank collaborated with Gills to edit a book where 
the same points are made more strongly. Thus 'the contemporary 
world-system has a history of at least 5,000 years'. Wallerstein and 
his followers think that what marks off the period from about 1500 
is the process of 'continuous capital accumulation', but they claim 
to find this long before 1500 in their continuing world-system. 17 
Frank's earlier work on dependency in Latin America was often 
criticised as being too static, finding essentially the same impact since 
1500, and indeed Wallerstein's main contribution was to modify 
dependency theory to make it more dynamic. Precisely the same 
comment could be made about Frank's more recent writings. If one 
finds a world-system for the last 4000 or whatever years, then one 
really is ignoring change. We need rather to emphasise change, to 
disaggregate the data Gust as needs to be done with Eric Wolf's overly 
broad notion of a tributary mode of production which encompasses most 
of world history) to get beyond such general, and so not very 
heuristic, descriptions. Also, in a maybe unreconstructed way, I still 
feel capitalism makes a difference; nor is this just an article of faith, it 
can be demonstrated. More orthodox Marxists have often complained 
that Wallerstein finds the evolution of capitalism far too early, and indeed 
I would myself follow Marx and Eric Wolf, among others, in finding 
capitalism appearing in the eighteenth century, regardless of various 
proto-capitalisms and whatever before this. Nevertheless, while Frank 
and Gills, and Abu-Lughod, are obviously right to say there were 
connections and trade and even accumulations of capital (which 
however did not intervene in the productive process) long before 
capitalism-indeed this is a very familiar point indeed-capitalism 
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objectively made a most fundamental difference. To his credit Frank 
in his edited volume allows both Amin and Wallerstein to say this. It 
is refreshing to see Wallerstein and Frank both finding space in their 
own publications for views diametrically opposed to their own! 
Amin stresses that there were connections and regional systems 
in the tributary systems before the rise of European capitalism, but 
'capitalism is a qualitatively new age in universal history which 
started around 1500' .18 Wallerstein also continues to emphasise the 
'dramatic caesura that the creation of a capitalist world-economy 
imposed on the world'. 19 However, as Wallerstein himself has said 
we need to specify much more clearly the nature of world-systems 
before capitalism. Janet Abu-Lughod has contributed here, but I must 
say that Frank's efforts can hardly be seen as a step forward. 
Chase-Dunn and Hall have produced a much more satisfactory and 
challenging contribution. In the lead chapter for their edited collection20 
they follow the others in saying that there have been world-systems 
long before capitalism. Some of these are stateless, but most are state-
based. However, it is incorrect to assume that in these systems one has 
to find the sort of core/periphery (this is their usage) relations that one 
finds in the capitalist system. Rather than assuming this, they ask that 
scholars look in a fresh way at 'the existence and nature of intersocietal 
inequalities'. Even though one may well find, in state-based world-
systems, a core which accumulates resources by exploiting peripheries, 
intersocietal hierarchies could also be quite different from those which 
developed under capitalism. 
They also confront Wallerstein's perceived economism by noting 
that there are all sorts of exchanges: trade, information, presumably, 
along Voll's lines, even religion. Even if one only looks at material 
exchanges, these can be gifts, tribute, commodity trade, etc. Here they 
agree with Schneider and say that exchange of prestige goods is 
not epiphenomenal at all. They can be very important as elites can use 
them to get or maintain power. Thus, at least by implication they find 
that luxuries, as well as necessities, can create systemic relations. 
Similarly, Braudel's claim that hegemony, even before capitalism, was 
always based on economic domination is questionable. They claim 
that more often in these world-systems it was political and military 
power which created inequality. 
As they say, all exchange is not unequal exchange. Thus there 
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are broadly two types of core-periphery relations in pre-capitalist 
world-systems. First is core/periphery differentiation, where there is 
interaction between societies in a world-system, as compared with core/ 
periphery hierarchies, where there is domination which can include 
political domination, extraction of resources, and unequal exchange. 
One task is to measure degrees of intersocietal exploitation, and this 
is very difficult, especially when the kinds of resources which are 
socially valued differ. 
Finally, they produce a list of world-system types. They follow Wolf's 
three modes of production, and find the Indian Ocean to be an 
example of 'commercializing state-based world-systems in which 
important aspects of commodification have developed but the system 
is still dominated by the logic of the tributary modes'. In the core of 
these commercialising world-systems, in which the core seems to be 
an empire, there is more use of money, of credit and interest, of wage 
labour, and of price-setting markets. In the core-empires the rulers 
use sophisticated means to tax merchants, 'and outside the bounds of 
empires, in interstitial semiperipheral regions, autonomous city-states 
controlled by merchant and production capitalists created and sustained 
market relations between empires and peripheral regions'. They say 
these centralised empires will be more exploitative towards peripheries 
than earlier empires, as they are better at concentrating resources at the 
centre. But of course they are not nearly as efficient at extracting 
resources as was the later capitalist core in the modern world-system. 
Nor indeed are peripheries essential in these tributary empires. They 
claim that in China the mode of production was tributary certainly, but 
accumulation was mostly accomplished without exploiting peripheral 
areas. There may be a problem here in that their identification of 
empires as the cores implies much more integrated and effective 
premodern empires than may be justified. In other words, empires 
may in their own territory include the whole range of cores, peripheries, 
and semi peripheries, as indeed Palat and Wallerstein claimed in the case 
of India. True, they are writing of India during one of its periods of 
political fragmentation, but I am sure that when India was united in 
one empire, say under the Mughals in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries, there still were core and peripheral areas. 21 
There is a large congruence here between what Palat and Wallerstein 
have to say, and the Chase-Dunn and Hall model. Both, unlike Abu-
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Lughod, are pointing to precapitalist world economies in which there 
can be exploitation and extraction. Palat and Wallerstein in their case 
study are explicit on this point, while Chase-Dunn and Hall accept this 
as being likely, at least in their state-based systems. Empirically there 
is little question that India, or parts of India, must be seen as the core of 
an Indian Ocean world-economy. It is for other specialists to apply these 
insights to areas such as the Middle East or Southeast Asia, the two 
areas where Palat and Wallerstein find the greatest impact from the 
Indian core in this pre-modem period. My own contribution will be 
to sketch in a very preliminary way how these models can elucidate 
connections in one part of this world-economy, that is across the Arabian 
Sea between India and East Africa. In particular I will present a little of 
my on-going research on East Africa to show how we can approach its 
history in an international context. 
East Africa has been subjected to a variety of political economy 
analyses. In the 1970s Marxists, inspired by Catherine Coquery-
Vidrovitch, engaged in what finally turned out to be a rather fruitless 
debate over modes of production in Africa.22 More recently the field 
has been held by dependista writings inspired by the early A. G. Frank. 
Rodney, Sheriff, Alpers and Bhila all produced empirically grounded 
books which claimed to find a continuous history of underdevelopment 
in East Africa going back to the fourteenth century, or even earlier. 23 A 
strong point of their analyses was that they avoided Eurocentrism by 
finding that the Portuguese in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries 
continued an existing system of exploitation rather than initiating a new 
process. The crucial break came late in the eighteenth century when 
the East African slave trade expanded very greatly under the auspices 
of the Omani state of Zanzibar, or even a century later with European 
colonialism. In other words, when industrial capitalism replaced 
merchant capital East Africa was subjected to a much more efficient 
exploitation than previously. But this is seen as an intensification 
rather than something completely different. Empiricist writers such as 
Newitt and Austen have found this perception of a seamless web to be 
unconvincing. 24 
The distinction to be made is between the Swahili coast and the 
interior of East Africa, and especially between the coast and the states 
around the Zambezi river on the Zimbabwe plateau, notably Great 
Zimbabwe and then the Mutapa state. In the early modem period the 
173 
M. N. Pearson 
main exports from these states were ivory and gold (slaves came 
later). Imports were mostly Indian-made cloths and beads. Ostensibly 
then we are looking at the export of raw materials, and the import of 
manufactures, and this seems to show a clear first world/third world 
situation of exploitation. This perception is reinforced when we note 
the vast profits that foreign traders were making from this exchange. 
However when we look at the relative values of these goods we find 
something different. Both gold and ivory were produced using 
discretionary, male, labour, and this was not extracted from more 
'productive' activities such as embryonic manufactures or food 
cultivation. Nor was either product highly prized in the interior states. 
Gold is most valuable in a monetised economy, and these were not. 
Ivory, culturally so important for jewellery and ornamentation in India, 
was sometimes used for fencing in the African interior. Elephants were 
usually hunted for their food, not their tusks. As for imports, low cost 
beads and cloths from India were highly prized in Africa. This concept 
of relative values is quite in accordance with Wallerstein's luxury-
necessity dichotomy, for he notes that 'each side tends to have different 
cultural definitions of value. ' 25 The result was mutual windfalls for 
both sides in this most unusual trade between India and the African 
interior, a benign situation congruent with Abu-Lughod's analysis 
of a rather different area .of research. In the absence of any sign of 
exploitation of the interior, or any hint of unequal exchange, these areas 
must be regarded as being external to the Indian core. 
The Swahili city states strung along the East African littoral acted in 
a classic compradorial way as mediators between the overseas core and 
the interior. The coast was linked to the interior through a whole 
hierarchy of intermediaries. Richard Wilding very aptly noted that we 
need to distinguish three main trade units: the hinterland network; the 
coastal interface; and the Indian Ocean network. 26 On the coast foreign 
traders sold to the Swahili, who themselves at this time never went 
inland, for both cultural and economic reasons. Rather they negotiated 
with particular tribes in their umland, 27 and these then with long-distance 
traders who accessed the far interior. There is some evidence of 
deindustrialisation in these ports: thus Spear claims that 'The weaving 
industries of Kilwa, Lamu and the Benaadir were severely curtailed by 
Indian cloth imports'.28 More generally the terms and conditions of 
trade and of production were not controlled by these Swahili middlemen. 
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Thus Kilwa's wealth came from its control of the gold trade through 
Sofala, and demand for gold fluctuated world-wide and affected very 
greatly Kilwa's prosperity. Nevertheless, in one of the better periods 
the early thirteenth century palace complex at Kilwa is described as 
being 'as spacious as any roofed stone building south of the Sahara 
until modern times' .29 In their janus-faced nature, and in their 
subordination to the Indian core, the Swahili coast can be seen to be a 
classic semi-periphery, in Chase-Dunn and Hall's terms autonomous 
city-states controlled by merchant and production capitalists in an 
interstitial semi peripheral region; they consider that such city-states tie 
in an imperial core with a peripheral area. However, if we accept the 
sketch above of the nature of trade and production in the interior, then 
we have the rather unusual situation of a semiperiphery connecting a 
core area with an external one. Implicitly at least this may fit precisely 
with the Palat and Wallerstein sketch, for while they locate the East 
African coast within the world-economy centred on India, they say 
nothing about the African interior. 
Space precludes a more extended discussion. It is my hope that even 
this sketchy analysis will at least show the utility of world-system 
research in any discussion of the history of the Indian Ocean, and in a 
small way will contribute to one of the most fruitful areas of world-
system research today, that is the nature of pre-capitalist world-systems. 
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